When Parent’s Fight: Alaska’s Presumption Against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence by Bolotin, Lisa
4--BOLOTIN__FINAL2.DOC 12/5/2008 3:53:15 PM 
 
WHEN PARENTS FIGHT:     
ALASKA’S PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
AWARDING CUSTODY TO 




  Because of the negative effects domestic violence has on a child’s 
development, many states, including Alaska, have adopted a rebuttable 
presumption that awarding custody to a parent who has committed domestic 
violence is not in the child’s best interests. Once the presumption is triggered, 
the parent who perpetrated domestic violence cannot be awarded any form of 
custody. To invoke the presumption, a certain level of domestic violence has to 
have been committed, the victim must be a domestic living partner, and the 
violence must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The presumption 
may be rebutted by demonstrating rehabilitation, lack of substance abuse, and 
that the best interests of the child require custody. The presumption is 
effective because it encourages victims to leave their abusers, ensures that 
courts consider domestic violence in their custody determinations, nullifies 
other considerations that disfavor the abused parent, and simplifies custody 
cases. The Alaska statute could be improved, however, by clarifying key 
terms, allowing children to raise the presumption, and providing judges less 
discretion in undoing the presumption’s effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Changes in child custody laws are commonplace in the United 
States, as legislatures continually search to serve the best interests of the 
child. The high stakes and high emotions of contested custody cases 
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present the greatest challenges. In these cases, the existence of domestic 
violence further compounds the complexity of making a decision that 
actually serves the child’s best interests. Following a litany of social 
science research revealing the negative effects domestic violence may 
have on a child’s development, states began strengthening the language 
in their child custody statutes to ensure that the existence of domestic 
violence is appropriately considered in custody decisions. One approach 
has been to create a rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to a 
parent who has perpetrated a certain level of domestic violence is not in 
a child’s best interests. Alaska adopted such a presumption in 2004. 
This Note will explain and critique Alaska’s presumption and its 
possible effects on child custody decisions. Part I of this Note explains 
the theory behind two custody presumptions. Part II explores the 
historical context of rebuttable presumptions. Part III explains the 
operation of the Alaska rebuttable presumption: its effect on custody 
decisions, how it may be invoked, and when it may be rebutted. Finally, 
Parts IV and V explore the strengths and weaknesses of the statute and 
argue that while the presumption may ultimately protect victims of 
domestic violence, either the courts or the legislature must further define 
key terms of the statute. Throughout this Note, frequent comparisons 
with custody laws in other states will help highlight the strengths, 
weaknesses, and underlying policy of the Alaska rebuttable 
presumption and will provide the basis for interpreting and critiquing 
the Alaska law. 
I.  THE RELEVANCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN DETERMINING 
CHILD CUSTODY 
A. Presumption of Joint Custody 
Courts attempt to serve the child’s best interests when making 
custody decisions.1  Legislatures are free to enumerate factors for courts 
to consider when deciding what arrangements will be most beneficial to 
a child. Although today nearly every state requires courts to consider 
evidence of domestic violence as relevant to custody decisions, many 
legislatures also express a preference for joint physical custody.2 With 
 
 1. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 931 (2008) (“In divorce 
proceedings, the ‘best interests’ of a child is a proper and feasible criterion for 
making a decision as to which of the two parents will be accorded custody of the 
child.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 2. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 732 (“[D]ivorce is 
now described as a process that, through mediation, restructures and 
4--BOLOTIN__FINAL2.DOC 12/5/2008  3:53:15 PM 
266 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 25:2 
the advent of no-fault divorce in the 1970s, courts shifted away from 
examining the relationship between parents when making child custody 
decisions and instead looked toward the future to determine their ability 
to parent.3 Unless a court foresaw that a past history of abuse would 
affect the child’s best interests—which it generally did not—domestic 
violence was not considered in making custody decisions.4 The 
preference for joint custody is rooted not only in the belief that co-
parenting is beneficial to a child of divorce, but also in the desire to 
protect parents’ rights to maintain relationships with their children.5 
First, joint physical and legal custody arrangements may be in a 
child’s best interests. Studies show that children adjust better to divorce 
and exhibit fewer behavioral problems when both parents share social 
and financial responsibility for the child than when only one parent 
bears those responsibilities.6 Social scientists also suggest educational 
and social benefits: children who interact with their fathers post-divorce 
have higher IQs, greater success in school, and lower drop-out and 
truancy rates than children who do not.7 Further, absence of the non-
 
reformulates the spouses' relationship, conferring equal or shared parental rights 
on both parents although one, in practice, usually assumes the primary 
responsibility.”). 
 3. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic 
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1991) (discussing 
the decline in applying fault-based divorce principles to determine custody); 
DONNA S. HERSHKOWITZ & DREW R. LIEBERT, ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., DIVORCE 
REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: FROM FAULT TO NO-FAULT… AND BACK AGAIN? (Cal. 
1997) (describing the rise of no-fault divorce in California and the United States); 
Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Status of Maternal Preference Rule or 
Presumption in Child Custody Cases, 70 A.L.R. 3d 262 (1976) (discussing court 
cases in which the court considered whether there is a preference or 
presumption favoring custody with the mother). 
 4. See infra Part V.A. 
 5. Elton H. v. Naomi R., 119 P.3d 969, 977 n.31 (Alaska 2005) (“A parent 
cannot be deprived of custody based solely on the best interest of the child.”) 
(citing Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1054–55 (Alaska 1975)); Irwin Garfinkel 
& Sarah McLanahan, The Effects of the Child Support Provisions of the Family 
Support Act of 1988 on Child Well-Being, 9 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 205, 212 
(1990) (reviewing the disadvantages children from single-parent families face). 
 6. Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children’s Well-
being: A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557, 564 (1999) (finding that 
children’s academic success was positively related to father’s payment of child 
support); Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live 
Apart: The Father’s Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 87–93 (1991) 
(finding that nonresident fathers’ involvement in their children’s social life and 
in making decisions about the child is positively correlated with paying child 
support); Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra note 5, at 224 (finding that “[i]ncreases 
in child support payments affect child well-being”). 
 7. See Chadwick L. Menning, Absent Parents Are More Than Money: The Joint 
Effect of Activities and Financial Support on Youths’ Educational Attainment, 23 J. 
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custodial parent may negatively affect the psychological and emotional 
development of children.8 However, when parents are unable to 
cooperate with each other after a divorce, the benefits children receive 
from co-parenting may cease to exist.9 
Second, joint custody protects both parents’ rights to maintain a 
parental relationship with their children. In the mid-1970s, child custody 
laws favored the mother: tender-years presumptions awarded custody 
of young children to mothers, absent a showing that she was unfit.10 
Following a vocal fathers’ rights movement, those presumptions were 
abolished in favor of those providing for joint custody.11 By 1990, the 
maternal preference had ceased to exist in all but five states.12 
 
FAM. ISSUES 648, 661–63 (2002) (finding that participating in activities with a 
nonresident parent increases a child’s chance of obtaining a high school diploma 
and attending a post-secondary institution); Douglas B. Downey, When Bigger is 
not Better: Family Size, Resources, and Children’s Educational Performance, 60 AM. 
SOC. REV. 746, 756 (1995) (finding that as parents contribute fewer economic and 
interpersonal resources, their children’s academic achievement declines; finding 
that frequency of discussion has the biggest effect on academic performance). 
 8. See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative 
Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 701–20 (1985) (discussing the effects of 
divorce on children and the value of co-parenting). 
 9. See infra note 15. 
 10. JOHN E. B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRACTICE 73 
(1998); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 155 (1989); see Trenkner, supra 
note 3, § 9(a); see, e.g., Wetzler v. Wetzler, 570 P.2d 741, 742 (Alaska 1977) 
(“Under the ‘tender years’ doctrine, a mother will generally be given preference 
for custody if the other factors are evenly balanced.”); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 
299, 310 (Ohio 1877) (holding that where the father “is a suitable person, able 
and willing to support and care for [his children], his right [to custody] is 
paramount to that of all other persons, except that of the mother in cases where the 
infant child is of such tender years as to require her present care . . .”) (emphasis 
added); Weaver v. Weaver, 261 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (“A 
mother, except in extraordinary circumstances, should be with her child of 
tender years. The courts have repeatedly recognized this as a primary 
doctrine.”). 
 11. RHODE, supra note 10, at 156; see, e.g., King v. Vancil, 341 N.E.2d 65 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1975) (holding that the Illinois tender years presumption violated the 
state’s equal protection clause). 
 12. See Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal 
of Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1994). 
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B. When Joint Custody Is Not in the Child’s Best Interests: Evidence 
of Abuse13 
When domestic violence is present in a household, physical contact 
with the abusive parent may not be in the best interests of the child, 
even when abuse was never directed at the child.14 The presumption 
that joint custody is in a child’s best interests assumes co-parenting 
produces benefits that are not present when one parent acts as the sole 
decision-maker. Those benefits—both those to the child and those to the 
parents—are not present where the parents have been in an abusive 
relationship.15 First, the possibility of future physical harm indicates that 
custody with a perpetrator of domestic violence is not in a child’s best 
interests. Second, ongoing contact with the abusive parent may be 
 
 13. Some argue that the benefits of co-parenting exist only in unique 
families. See, e.g., Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody and Visitation Decisions in 
Domestic Violence Cases: Legal Trends, Research Findings, and Recommendations 
(1998), http://new.vawnet.org/category/Main_Doc.php?docid=371  
(“Enthusiasm for joint custody in the early 1980s was fueled by studies of 
couples who were highly motivated to make it work.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Further, many surveys and studies assert that joint custody 
presumptions are almost never in the child’s best interests. See, e.g., Gerald W. 
Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 201, 207 
(1998) (“The criticisms are valid. It is extremely difficult in one sense to design a 
research tool sufficient to measure something as complex as ‘joint custody.’”); 
Thomas J. Reidy et al., Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 
75, 80 (1989) (“The most frequently cited reasons [for failure of joint custody] 
included poor cooperation (30.5 percent), instability created by shifting from 
home to home (29.8 percent), distance between homes (25.5 percent), and 
acrimony and revenge between the parents (19.1 percent).”); Jana B. Singer & 
William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 507 (1988) 
(“The limited number of studies relied upon by joint custody proponents have 
other serious methodological shortcomings.”). Whether such statements are true 
is outside the scope of this Note, though the assertion that joint custody is never 
in a child’s best interests does not contradict the thesis of this Note. 
 14. See H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. § 1 (1990) (“[F]or purposes of 
determining child custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of a spouse 
should create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to be 
placed in the custody of the abusive spouse.”). 
 15. See Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live 
Apart: The Father's Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 81 (1991); Paul 
R. Amato, The Consequence of Divorce for Adults and Children, 62 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 1269, 1280 (“Interparental hostility and lack of cooperation between 
parents following divorce is a consistent predictor of poor outcomes among 
offspring. . . . Conflict was especially aversive if it involved physical violence or 
made children feel as if they were caught in the middle.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Amato & Gilbreth, supra note 6, at 564 (finding only a small correlation 
between contact with a nonresident father and children’s academic success and 
ability to internalize problems); Alan Booth & Paul R. Amato, Parental Predivorce 
Relations and Offspring Postdivorce Well-Being, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 197, 211 
(concluding that dissolution of high-conflict families benefits children). 
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detrimental to the child’s development. Third, requiring hostile parents 
to remain in contact can harm the parents and negate the positive effects 
of co-parenting. 
1. Potential Physical Harm.  Custody with a perpetrator of 
domestic violence is not in a child’s best interests because it is more 
likely to result in physical harm to the child. Perpetrators of domestic 
violence are more likely than non-perpetrators to abuse their children. A 
review of more than thirty studies shows that child abuse and violence 
toward another household member are linked between 30% and 60% of 
the time.16 Another study suggests that the presence of domestic 
violence indicates a 40% to 70% probability that the child is also being 
physically abused.17 
A child in a family where domestic violence is present is likely to 
be physically harmed even when violence has previously been directed 
only at the abuser’s partners. Physical harm to a previously unharmed 
child may occur because the abused parent takes out her stress on the 
child, because the abuser redirects his attention, or because the child 
gets in the way of the abuse. For example, in a study of 146 children ages 
eleven to seventeen from violent homes, all sons over the age of fourteen 
had attempted to protect their mothers from abuse; 62% of those 
children were injured in the process.18  Even if the abuser is with a new 
partner, the child may not be safe from physical harm. One research 
study found that 58% of male offenders perpetrated violence against 
their new partners after the dissolution of a previously abusive 
relationship.19 
In fact, incidents of violence are likely to continue when a domestic 
violence survivor leaves a partner who has been abusing her. In one 
study, more than one third of battered women were re-assaulted after 
they had separated from their abusive partners.20 In Canada, 39% of 
abused women reported that violence began only after separation; 24% 
 
 16. JEFFREY L. EDLESON ET AL., PARENTING IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 9 (2003), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/ 
pdffiles/fullReport.pdf. 
 17. Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman 
Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134 (1999); accord DAVID ROBINSON & JO-
ANNE TAYLOR, THE INCIDENCE OF FAMILY VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS: A FILE REVIEW STUDY (Correctional Service of Canada No. FV-03, 
1995) available at http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/fv/fv03/toce-eng.shtml. 
 18. Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421, 424 (1991). 
 19. Sharon Woffordt et al., Continuities in Marital Violence, 9 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 
195, 215 (1994). 
 20. Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the Crossfire, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 991, 992 (2005) (reviewing literature on post-separation violence). 
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reported that pre-existing violent behavior escalated post-separation.21 A 
study of 235 Canadian women revealed that 25% were threatened by 
their abuser during child visitations.22 These studies demonstrate that 
putting the perpetrator and the victim in a position where they are likely 
to have future contact, as when they share physical or legal custody of 
their child, only heightens the risk to the victim.23 When a parent is at 
risk of violence, so are those around her, including her children. 
2. Detriment to Child’s Development.  Merely observing domestic 
violence may have the same effect on a child as actually being abused. 
Children who witness domestic abuse experience increased health 
problems as well as impaired behavioral and emotional functioning, 
even when they are not abused themselves.24 
First, children who grow up in households with domestic violence 
experience short-term health problems, including asthma, insomnia, and 
ulcers, at a higher rate than children who do not witness abuse.25 
Second, these children are at a higher risk for mental health problems, 
including depression, aggression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.26 Third, witnessing domestic violence may impair children’s 
cognitive functioning.27 Fourth, long-term behavioral and emotional 
problems, like depression in adulthood and difficulties with social 
adjustment, are more common among children who witness domestic 
violence.28 
 
 21. Canadian Ctr. for Justice Statistics, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN CANADA: A 
STATISTICAL PROFILE 31 (2001). 
 22. B. LEIGHTON, SPOUSAL ABUSE IN METROPOLITAN TORONTO: RESEARCH 
REPORT ON THE RESPONSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Solicitor General of 
Canada No. 1989-02, 1989). 
 23. See Ruth E. Fleury et al., When Ending the Relationship Does Not End the 
Violence: Women’s Experiences of Violence by Former Partners, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 1315, 1376 (2000) (finding that proximity to victim is a key factor in post-
separation assault). 
 24. Jeffrey L. Edelson, Children’s Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 839, 845 (1999) (reviewing thirty-one studies of 
children who witnessed domestic violence between their parents but who were 
not abused themselves). 
 25. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 
246; Marjory D. Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and its Relevance in 
Custody and Visitation Decisions in New York State, 3 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
221, 230 (1994). 
 26. Edelson, Children’s Witnessing Domestic Violence, supra note 24, at 846; 
Goodmark, supra note 25, at 258; Fields, supra note 25, at 230; Alan J. Tomkins et 
al., Plight of Children who Witness Woman Battering: Psychological Knowledge and 
Policy Implications, 18 LAW AND PYSCHOL. REV. 137, 145–49 (1994). 
 27. Edelson, Children’s Witnessing Domestic Violence, supra note 24, at 860. 
 28. Id. at 860–61; Goodmark, supra note 25, at 250; Tomkins et al., supra note 
26, at 149–52. 
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Perhaps most disturbingly, children who grow up in homes where 
domestic violence is present tend to imitate the violent behavior—or 
become victims of domestic violence—later in life.29 A study conducted 
by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention found that 
70% of adolescents who lived in families with parental conflicts reported 
violent delinquency, compared to 49% of adolescents from households 
without conflict.30 Another study revealed that male juveniles who 
committed violent offenses were 50% more likely to have witnessed 
domestic violence than were juveniles who committed non-violent 
offenses.31 On the other hand, some children who witness spousal abuse 
become more passive and are thus more likely to be victims of abuse 
themselves.32 
Congress noted that domestic violence negatively impacts 
children’s development: 
[E]ven children who do not directly witness spousal abuse are 
affected by the climate of violence in their homes and 
experience shock, fear, guilt, long lasting impairment of self-
esteem, and impairment of developmental and socialization 
skills . . . tendencies may be passed on from one generation to 
the next . . . [and] witnessing an aggressive parent as a role 
model may communicate to children that violence is an 
acceptable tool for resolving marital conflict[.]33 
 
 29. Joel S. Milner et al., Childhood History of Abuse and Adult Child Abuse 
Potential, 5 J. OF FAM. VIOLENCE 15 (finding that a childhood history of physical 
abuse was significantly related to adult physical child abuse potential and that 
more severe abuse in childhood increased abuse potential); DAVID ROBINSON & 
JO-ANNE TAYLOR, THE INCIDENCE OF FAMILY VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS: A FILE REVIEW STUDY (Correctional Service of Canada No. FV-03 
1995) (finding that one quarter of male inmates in federal prison studies had 
witnessed abuse of siblings or parents), available at http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/fv/fv03/toce-eng.shtml; Edelson, Children’s Witnessing 
Domestic Violence, supra note 24, at 861 (finding that several studies of domestic 
violence report a link between childhood victimization and criminal behavior in 
adulthood). 
 30. TERRENCE P. THORNBURY, FACT SHEET #21: VIOLENT FAMILIES AND YOUTH 
VIOLENCE (1994), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/fs-9421.txt. 
 31. Steve Spacarelli et al., Exposure to Serious Family Violence Among 
Incarcerated Boys, 10 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 163, 171 (1995). 
 32. See Elaine Hilberman & Kit Munson, Sixty Battered Women, 2 
VICTIMOLOGY 460, 463 (1978) (noting that girls who observed domestic violence 
“were likely to become withdrawn, passive, clinging, and anxious”); Tomkins et 
al., supra note 26, at 151 (“Girls may learn that victimization is inevitable and 
that no one can help change this pattern.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 33. H.R. Rep. No. 101-737, at 3 (1990). 
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3. Inability to Co-Parent.  Requiring hostile parents to remain in 
contact with each other can harm the parents and negate the positive 
effects of co-parenting. “Domestic violence or battering is a means of 
establishing control over another person through fear and intimidation. 
[Battering] includes emotional, economic, and sexual abuse, and the 
kind of isolation that is experienced by hostages or prisoners of 
war . . .”34 A person who has abused his spouse only once may use the 
fear evoked by memory of the abuse to continue to control his former 
partner.35 In such situations, joint legal custody is inappropriate because 
the abusive ex-spouse can still manipulate the victim ex-spouse, 
effectively maintaining sole decision-making power for their child.36 
Even if the abusive parent is not using fear to further control his 
victim, it may be impossible to reap the benefits of co-parenting where 
there is a history of violence between parents. The relationship between 
the parents lacks the trust, communication, respect, and equality 
necessary for making decisions together and maintaining regular 
contact.  A study by the State of Washington concluded that joint 
physical custody in high-conflict families is detrimental to children and 
does not foster better communication or cooperation between parents.37 
Since allowing the perpetrator to have contact with the child creates a 
risk that the perpetrator will continue to undermine the victim’s 
parenting and victim’s relationship with the child, custody with the 
perpetrator is not in a child’s best interest.38 
II.  THE POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTIONS 
In 2004, Alaska passed House Bill 385, amending its child custody 
statute to read: 
 
 34. Battered Women and Child Custody Litigation: Hearing on H.R. 1252, H.R. 
1253 and H. Con. Res. 89 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property & Judicial 
Administration of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 22 (1992) (statement 
of Rep. Constance A. Morella). 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 71–73 (statement of Melanie S. Griffin, Executive Director, New 
Jersey Commission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes). 
 37. DIANE N. LYE, WASHINGTON STATE PARENTING ACT STUDY (1999), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/index.cfm (follow “Washington State 
Parenting Act Study” hyperlink; then follow “Chapter 4: What the Experts Say” 
hyperlink). 
 38. LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, ASSESSING RISK TO CHILDREN FROM 
BATTERERS 2 (2002), available at http://new.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet 
/RisktoChildren.pdf. 
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There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a 
history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other 
parent, a child, or a domestic living partner may not be 
awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal 
custody, or joint physical custody of a child.39 
House Bill 385 is consistent with national trends.  Beginning in the 
1990’s, state and federal governments began to take note of the 
detrimental effect joint custody assumptions might have on children. 
The United States Congress passed a concurrent resolution expressing 
the sense of the Congress that evidence of physical abuse creates “a 
statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to be placed in 
the custody of the abusive spouse.”40 The National Council of Juvenile 
and Family Court Judges agreed; in 1994, the Council released the 
Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence, which states: 
In every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to the 
custody of a child, a determination by the court that domestic 
or family violence has occurred raises a rebuttable presumption 
that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of 
the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or 
joint physical custody with the perpetrator of family violence.41 
The presumption is also supported by the American Bar Association42 
and the American Psychological Association.43 
State legislatures have taken two approaches to incorporating 
evidence of domestic violence in child custody decisions. Some states 
have enacted laws requiring that a history of domestic violence be 
considered when determining a child’s best interests while allowing the 
judge to maintain discretion in weighing such evidence. Others, 
including Alaska, have gone further, creating a rebuttable presumption 
against awarding custody to a parent who has perpetrated domestic 
violence in the past. 
III. OPERATION OF THE ALASKA AMENDMENT 
To understand the effect of House Bill 385, Alaska’s child custody 
laws must be examined as a whole. Alaska law does not presume joint 
 
 39. H.B. 385, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2004). 
 40. H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. § 1 (1990). 
 41. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 401 (1994). 
 42. See A.B.A. House of Delegates, Approved Resolutions Related to 
Domestic Violence (1989) (“Joint custody is inappropriate in cases in which 
spouse abuse, child abuse, or parental kidnapping is likely to occur.”). 
 43. See A.B.A., VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 99 (1996). 
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or sole custody; rather, the court determines custody in accordance with 
the best interests of the child.44 Section 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes 
enumerates a list of non-exhaustive factors that judges shall consider in 
determining the child’s best interests: 
(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs 
of the child; 
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs; 
(3) the child’s preference if the child is of sufficient age and 
capacity to form a preference; 
(4) the love and affection existing between the child and each 
parent; 
(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory 
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; 
(6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and 
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the 
other parent and the child, except that the court may not 
consider this willingness and ability if one parent shows that 
the other parent has sexually assaulted or engaged in domestic 
violence against the parent or a child, and that a continuing 
relationship with the other parent will endanger the health or 
safety of either the parent or the child; 
(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child 
neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of 
violence between the parents; 
(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other 
members of the household directly affects the emotional or 
physical well-being of the child; 
(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent.45 
Before House Bill 385 was enacted, judges had discretion to weigh 
those factors as they saw fit. Therefore, a judge could determine that it 
was not in a child’s best interests to award legal or physical custody to a 
parent who had perpetrated domestic violence.46 A judge could also 
determine that a history of domestic violence against a spouse did not 
make a person unfit to parent, and thus award physical or legal custody 
to a parent with a history of perpetrating abuse.47 
 
 44. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (2006). 
 45. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (2006). 
 46. See, e.g., Farrell v. Farrell, 819 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1991) (awarding sole 
custody to mother after considering history of domestic violence perpetrated by 
father). 
 47. See Carstens v. Carstens, 867 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1994) (upholding custody 
award to father who had a history of perpetrating domestic violence where there 
was no showing that the abuse affected or would affect the child). 
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Since section 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes was amended in 2004, 
few appellate cases have addressed the presumption.48 In 2005, 
roundtable discussions in Bethel and Fairbanks revealed that 
practitioners and domestic violence advocates were still concerned with 
how House Bill 385 would operate.49 Roundtable participants in Bethel 
noted that they were unsure of how the bill would be implemented; 
those in Fairbanks were concerned that difficulties in deciding whether 
domestic violence occurred would complicate custody proceedings and 
that the presumption would “lead to a ‘run’ on [domestic violence] 
courts,” stretching already limited resources.50 Despite initial concerns 
over implementation, the language of the statute and operation of 
presumptions in other states clarifies how House Bill 385 was intended 
to operate. First, House Bill 385 is equivalent to a legislative statement 
that placement with a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence is 
not in a child’s best interests. Second, House Bill 385 requires that a 
parent perpetrate a certain level of violence against other household 
members before the presumption takes effect. Third, the presumption 
against custody may be rebutted by enumerated showings. 
A. Effect of Presumption 
The most important aspect of section 25.24.150 of the Alaska 
Statutes is that it creates a presumption against custody when one 
parent has committed a certain level of violence against another parent 
or other household member.51 Considering domestic violence in custody 
decisions is not unique: statutes in forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia include domestic violence as a factor that courts must or may 
consider in custody disputes.52 Twenty-two of those states apply a 
rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to the perpetrator of 
domestic violence is not in the child’s best interests.53 
 
 48. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. McGraw, 134 P.3d 338 (Alaska 2006) (holding that 
section 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes did not apply because case had 
concluded by the effective date of amendments). 
 49. BARBARA HOOD, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, CHILDREN IN ALASKA’S COURTS: 
REPORT ON REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 58 (2005), available at http://www. 
state.ak.us/courts/outreach/children.pdf. 
 50. Id. at 59. 
 51. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006). 
 52. See Annette M. Gonzalez & Linda M. Rio Reichmann, Representing 
Children in Civil Cases Involving Domestic Violence, 39 FAM. L.Q. 197 app. A (2005) 
(listing custody statutes in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. 
territories). 
 53. See id. at 198 n.5 (listing the twenty-four states and territories that have a 
rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator of domestic 
violence). 
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Alaska’s presumption operates such that once a court has 
recognized that a parent has committed a certain level of domestic 
violence against a domestic partner, that parent cannot be awarded 
custody.54 The presumption does not allow the perpetrator to be 
awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or 
joint physical custody of a child.55 Some state presumption statutes 
apply only to joint custody.56 For example, Idaho’s custody laws contain 
a presumption that joint custody is not in a child’s best interests if one of 
the parents is a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence.57 Unlike 
Alaska, Idaho has a statutory presumption that joint custody is in a 
minor’s best interests.58 Therefore, the Idaho presumption against joint 
custody where domestic violence is present is necessary to offset a 
statute that would otherwise favor it.59 The Alaska statute is stronger 
than those in states like Idaho, because it is not necessary to overcome a 
conflicting presumption, and it bars a perpetrator of domestic violence 
from maintaining any type of custody. 
Further, Alaska juries are required to apply subsections 150(h)–(i) 
whenever one party presents credible evidence of domestic violence. In 
Puddicombe v. Dreka,60 one of the few Alaska cases to apply section 
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes, the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
anytime the record shows that domestic violence has occurred, the court 
must address whether it amounted to a history of perpetrating domestic 
violence.61 The Puddicombe court found plain error where the trial court 
recognized that both parents had perpetrated domestic violence, but the 
trial court failed to consider section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes.62 
Less than a year later, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this holding 
in Michele M. v. Richard R.63 There, Michele M. presented unrebutted 
evidence that Richard R. abused his first wife.64 The superior court 
awarded custody to Richard, applying the best interest factors in section 
 
 54. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (2008) (“There shall be a 
presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of a minor child if one  
of the parents is found by the court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic 
violence as defined in section 39–6303, Idaho Code.”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See King v. King, 50 P.3d 453, 460 (Idaho 2002). 
 59. Act of April 1, 1994, ch. 340, 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 1075. 
 60. 167 P.3d 73 (Alaska 2007). 
 61. Id. at 77. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 177 P.3d 830, 837–38 (Alaska 2008). 
 64. Id. at 837. 
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150(c).65 Although the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that 
Richard’s behavior might not have amounted to a “history of 
perpetrating domestic violence,” the court reversed and remanded the 
custody decision since the superior court failed to explicitly make such a 
finding.66 These cases demonstrate the strength of the rebuttable 
presumption: once the issue of domestic violence is properly raised, the 
court must address the question, and if it finds that domestic violence is 
present, it must decide against awarding custody to the perpetrator. 
An alternative approach is to consider domestic violence as one of 
many factors in making custody decisions. For example, New York’s 
custody statute states: 
Where either party to an action concerning custody of or a right 
to visitation with a child alleges . . . that the other party has 
committed an act of domestic violence against the party 
making the allegation or a family or household member of 
either party . . . and such allegations are proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the court must consider the effect 
of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child, 
together with such other facts and circumstances as the court 
deems relevant in making a direction pursuant to this section.67 
The New York statute thus requires that a court consider how the 
existence of domestic violence impacts the child’s best interests, but still 
leaves the door open for a judge to award joint or sole custody to a 
perpetrator of domestic violence. New York considered the factors that 
often encourage states to adopt presumptions like section 25.24.150(g) of 
the Alaska Statutes, but New York deliberately chose for the issue to be 
non-determinative in custody proceedings.68 
Finally, under the Alaska statute, if the court finds that both 
parents have a history of perpetrating domestic violence under section 
25.24.150(g), then the court has discretion to award custody to one of the 
two parents or to neither parent. Under section 25.24.150(i) of the Alaska 
Statutes, the court must either: 
 
 65. Id. at 833. 
 66. Id. at 837–38. 
 67. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 68. A.2446-c/S.7403-b, Laws of 1996, Ch. 85, § 1 (N.Y. 1996) (effective May 
21) (“Rather than imposing a presumption, the legislature hereby establishes 
domestic violence as a factor for the court to consider in child custody and 
visitation proceedings, regardless of whether the child has witnessed or has been 
a direct victim of the violence.”). 
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(1) award sole legal and physical custody to the parent who is 
less likely to continue to perpetrate the violence and require 
that the custodial parent complete a treatment program; or 
(2) if necessary to protect the welfare of the child, award sole 
legal or physical custody, or both, to a suitable third person if 
the person would not allow access to a violent parent except as 
ordered by the court.69 
Thus, when both parents are perpetrators of domestic violence, the 
court must exercise some discretion to determine how likely the parents 
are to continue abusive behavior. In some cases, the court must conduct 
the same best interests analysis that is explicitly outside the court’s 
discretion when only one parent has a history of perpetrating domestic 
violence. 
B. Presumption and the Friendly Parent Provision 
Absent evidence of domestic violence, one factor that Alaska judges 
must consider in determining custody is “the willingness and ability of 
each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing 
relationship between the other parent and the child . . .”70 This so-called 
“friendly parent provision” is an attempt to foster the relationship a 
child has with both parents. Assuming that co-parenting is in a child’s 
best interests, it is also in a child’s best interests to be placed with a 
parent who will be receptive to the non-custodial parent’s requests to 
see the child and who will consider the other parent’s wishes when 
making decisions for the child. Though the friendly parent provision is 
only one of a number of factors that judges are to consider in 
determining a child’s best interests, it was frequently the deciding factor 
prior to enactment of House Bill 385, despite evidence that the “friendly 
parent” was abusive.71 If the benefits of co-parenting outweigh the 
detriments of allowing an abusive parent to have physical and legal 
custody of a child, then this outcome was correct. 
Alaska courts were not unique in allowing the friendly parent 
provision to trump evidence of domestic violence. For example, in the 
 
 69. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(i) (2006). 
 70. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(6) (2006). 
 71. See Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill 
No. 385, at 0747, 0995, 1170 (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_single_minute.asp?session=23&beg_line=01301&end_line=0228&time=1310
&date=20040301&comm=JUD&house=H (statements of Tracy Gould, Kimberlee 
Vanderhoof, Gigi Pilcher) (detailing three custody disputes where the Alaska 
courts awarded custody to a male perpetrator of domestic violence because of 
the friendly parent provision). 
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Missouri case of Gant v. Gant,72 a mother provided unrebutted testimony 
that the father physically abused her.73 However, because the mother 
had moved out of the state and did not have a car to transport their 
children, the court found that the father was more likely to allow 
“frequent and meaningful” contact with the other parent.74 Therefore, 
the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to award primary physical 
custody to the abusive father.75 Similarly, in In re Marriage of Cobb,76 the 
Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed amending a joint custody award to an 
award of sole custody to the father, despite the mother’s allegations of 
child abuse, due to the parents’ inability to co-parent.77 
This precise outcome was a motivating factor behind adopting the 
rebuttable presumption in Alaska.78 During public hearings on House 
Bill 385, the Program Director for Careline Crisis Intervention told the 
story of a woman who was killed by her abuser because she did not 
obtain a protective order against him out of fear of acting out of 
compliance with the friendly parent provision.79 Another speaker noted 
that four women in Fairbanks alone were fatalities of the friendly parent 
provision during the course of a single custody hearing.80 Because of 
situations like those reported in the public hearings, Alaska courts do 
not consider the friendly parent provision where one parent has a 
history of perpetrating domestic violence; the presumption against 
 
 72. 923 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Missouri did not have a rebuttable 
presumption against awarding custody to perpetrators of domestic violence at 
the time Gant was decided. Id. at 530. 
 73. Id. at 528–29. The husband admitted to grabbing his wife by the face and 
pushing her over the couch; poking her in the eye; stating that he wanted to kill 
her; fighting with other men; and smashing watches, radios, and a television. Id. 
at 529. 
 74. Id. at 530–31. 
 75. Id. at 531. 
 76. 988 P.2d 272 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999). 
 77. Id. at 274–75. 
 78. Rep. Lesil McGuire, Sponsor Statement for H.B. 385, Mar. 15, 2004, 
available at http://www.akrepublicans.org/mcguire/23/spst/mcgu_hb385.php. 
(“The bill also modifies our statutes ‘friendly parent’ provision that 
inadvertently harms children, particularly in circumstances involving domestic 
violence, child abuse/sexual abuse and neglect.”). The American Bar 
Association also notes that applying the friendly parent provision is 
inappropriate where one parent has abused either the other parent or his or her 
children. ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, A JUDGE’S GUIDE: MAKING 
CHILD-CENTERED DECISIONS IN CUSTODY CASES 134 (2d ed. 2008), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/childcustody/judges_guide.pd
f. 
 79. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No. 
385, supra note 71, at 0995 (statement of Kimberlee Vanderhoof, Program 
Director of Careline Crisis Intervention). 
 80. Id. at 0747 (statement of Tracy Gould). 
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custody prevents the best interests analysis of which the friendly parent 
provision is a part.81 By prohibiting courts from finding that abused 
parents are poor co-parents and using that finding against the abused 
parent, Alaska’s custody statute may now encourage victims to report 
abuse in custody proceedings.82 
C. Invoking the Presumption 
The presumption in the Alaska statute is inherently limited. The 
Alaska statute explicitly provides that domestic violence must rise to a 
certain level before the presumption against custody is invoked. Further, 
the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) only applies when violence has 
been perpetrated against the abuser’s domestic living partner. Finally, 
the party raising the issue of abuse must prove abuse by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Requirement that Level of Violence Amount to a History of 
Perpetrating Violence.  The first requirement for the presumption to be 
raised is that one of the parents has a history of “perpetrating domestic 
violence.”83 Section 25.90.010 of the Alaska Statutes provides that in Title 
25, “domestic violence” has the meaning given in section 18.66.990 of the 
Alaska Statutes,84 which defines “domestic violence” to include crimes 
against the person, burglary, criminal trespass, arson, criminal mischief, 
terrorist threats, violating a protective order, and harassment.85 
Psychological and emotional abuse, absent commission of a crime or 
infliction of physical harm, do not constitute domestic violence, and 
therefore do not raise the presumption against custody.86 Psychological 
and emotional abuse may still be considered when a judge makes his 
custody determination if the abuse affects the child’s well-being, but 
evidence of psychological and emotional abuse will be balanced against 
other factors enumerated in section 150 to decide what custody 
arrangement is in the child’s best interests.87 
 
 81. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006). 
 82. See infra Part IV.B. Further protecting children and victimized parents, 
the Alaska Statute prohibits courts from denying custody to a parent based 
solely on the fact that the victimized parent is suffering from the effects of abuse, 
unless the effects are so severe they prevent the parent from safely caring for the 
child. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(k) (2006). 
 83. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006). 
 84. ALASKA STAT. § 25.90.010 (2006). 
 85. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2006). 
 86. See id. 
 87. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (2006). 
4--BOLOTIN__FINAL2.DOC 12/5/2008  3:53:15 PM 
2008 WHEN PARENTS FIGHT 281 
For the purposes of the child custody statute, a “perpetrator” of 
domestic violence has either committed one incident of domestic 
violence that leads to serious bodily injury or has committed multiple 
incidents of domestic violence.88 Alaska, unlike many other states, does 
not require multiple incidents of abuse to invoke its presumption.89 
Idaho, on the other hand, requires a parent be a “habitual perpetrator” 
of domestic violence before its presumption against custody arises.90 
Requiring ongoing abuse is designed to protect a parent whose violent 
episode is not characteristic of his ability to parent. However, labeling a 
single incident of abuse as an anomaly carries dangers as well: an abuser 
may be able to use just one incident of abuse to control the other parent, 
effectively maintaining sole decision-making power if he is awarded 
joint custody because he can still manipulate the victim.91 Therefore, 
awarding joint legal custody to such a parent is not in the child’s best 
interests. Further, a child can be traumatized by just one incident of 
abuse if he is aware of it.92 Giving physical custody to such a parent 
would not be in a child’s best interests. 
2. Requirement that Victim Be a Domestic Living Partner.  The 
second requirement to raise the presumption is that the offenses be 
perpetrated against the child, the other parent, or a “domestic living 
partner.”93 “Domestic living partner” is not defined in the statute.94 
However, the term at least includes married and unmarried parents 
petitioning for custody.95 
One possible interpretation of “domestic living partner” is that it 
has the same meaning as “household member,” as defined in Alaska’s 
 
 88. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(h) (2006). 
 89. See id. 
 90. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (2008). 
 91. Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence, in 
PARTNER VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF TWENTY YEARS OF RESEARCH 90 
(Janis L. Jasinski & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998). 
 92. Id. 
 93. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006); see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) 
(requiring that an offense be committed against a “household member” in order 
to meet the definition of domestic violence); § 18.66.990(5) (defining “household 
member”). 
 94. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (2006). 
 95. See Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73, 75 n.3 (Alaska 2007) (“AS 
25.24.150 establishes how the court should determine custody when the parents 
are divorcing. Unmarried parents may petition for custody under AS 25.20.060, 
which requires the court to consider the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.150(c) . . 
. .”). 
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domestic violence statutes.96 There, Alaska defines “household member” 
to include: 
(A) adults or minors who are current or former spouses; 
(B) adults or minors who live together or who have lived 
together; 
(C) adults or minors who are dating or who have dated; 
(D) adults or minors who are engaged in or who have engaged 
in a sexual relationship; 
(E) adults or minors who are related to each other up to the 
fourth degree of consanguinity, whether of the whole or half 
blood or by adoption, computed under the rules of civil law; 
(F) adults or minors who are related or formerly related by 
marriage; 
(G) persons who have a child of the relationship; and 
(H) minor children of a person in a relationship that is 
described in (A)-(G) of this paragraph.97 
Assuming that “domestic living partner” has the same meaning as 
“household member” may be appropriate since Alaska intended to 
adopt the approach of the Model Code of the Family Violence Project of 
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.98 The Model 
Code is written to raise the presumption wherever “domestic or family 
violence” has occurred.99 The Model Code describes “domestic or family 
violence” as occurring between “family or household member[s]”;100 the 
definition of “family or household members” in the Model Code is 
identical to the definition of “household members” in the Alaska 
Code.101 Therefore, the only way section 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes 
could adopt the Model Code approach would be to use the terms 
“household member” and “domestic living partner” interchangeably. 
On the other hand, “domestic living partner” may be more limited. 
Until recently, all appellate cases that applied section 25.24.150(g) of the 
Alaska Statutes concerned violence between parents of the child whose 
 
 96. See ALASKA STAT.  § 18.66.990(5) (2006). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill 
No. 385, supra note 71, at 0622 (statement of Lesil McGuire, Chair of the H. 
Judiciary Standing Comm. and Sponsor of H.B. 385) (explaining that the 
legislation would adopt the Model Code). 
 99. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 401 (1994). 
 100. Id. at § 102(1). 
 101. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(5) (2006) (defining “household 
member”), with MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC & FAMILY VIOLENCE, § 102(2) (1994) 
(defining “family or household member”). 
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custody was in dispute.102 However, a 2008 Alaska Supreme Court case 
clarifies that a spouse who is not the parent of the child also qualifies as 
a “domestic living partner.”103 In Michele M. v. Richard R., Michele M. 
and Richard R. had a child, Charles, out of wedlock.104 In 2006, Richard 
filed for sole legal and primary physical custody of Charles.105 At the 
hearing, Michele presented unrebutted testimony from Richard’s ex-
wife, whom he married after Charles’ birth, that Richard physically 
abused her on several occasions.106 The Alaska Supreme Court held that 
Richard’s record of violence against his ex-wife triggered the analysis in 
sections 25.24.150(g)–(i), requiring the court to determine whether this 
record amounted to a history of violence under section 150(h).107 It is 
unclear from the decision whether Richard’s ex-wife qualified as a 
“domestic living partner” merely because she had been married to 
Richard, or because she had lived with him after Charles’ birth. 
The Michele M. decision does not define the outer limits of 
“domestic living partner” but may suggest that only victims who 
actually lived with the perpetrator, the victim, or the child while the 
child was alive are considered “domestic living partners.” Such a 
definition makes sense, given that the purpose of the Alaska 
presumption is to protect children from the detrimental effects of 
domestic violence.108 The broader interpretation—”household 
member”—would include any past casual relationships, where a history 
of violence may not be indicative of a parent’s propensity to become 
violent against or to manipulate members of his family.109 Moreover, a 
 
 102. See Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73 (Alaska 2007) (considering 
domestic violence between unmarried parents of a child whose custody was in 
dispute); O’Dell v. O’Dell, No. S-12097, 2007 WL 1378153 (Alaska May 9, 2007) 
(determining whether ex-husband had committed multiple acts of domestic 
violence against his ex-wife in deciding custody of their son). 
 103. See Michele M. v. Richard R., 177 P.3d 830, 837–38 (Alaska 2008). 
 104. Id. at 831. 
 105. Id. at 832. 
 106. Id. at 833. 
 107. Id. at 837–38. 
 108. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No. 
385, supra note 71, at 0622 (statement of Lesil McGuire, Chair of H. Judiciary 
Standing Comm. and Sponsor of H.B. 385). 
 109. See Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Hearing on House Bill No. 314 
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 548 (Apr. 6, 1996), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/cm19/query=*/doc/%7B@7 
296%7D? (statement of Lauree Hugonin, member, Alaska Network on Domestic 
Violence and Sexual Assault) (noting that perpetrators of domestic violence 
sometimes carry weapons to mediation as an intimidation technique); Beth 
Goldstein Lewis Trimmer, A Sexual Relationship, Did We Have One?, 24 ALASKA L. 
REV. 237, 238–239 (2007) (explaining the potentially broad scope of “household 
member” under section 18.66.990(5) of the Alaska Statutes). 
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narrow interpretation is consistent with the Louisiana Post-Separation 
Family Violence Relief Act,110 upon which the Alaska statute was 
based.111 In 2002, a Louisiana appellate court refused to apply the 
presumption against custody where the father’s abusive actions towards 
the mother occurred prior to their marriage and the birth of their 
child.112 Since the Alaska Legislature adopted the Louisiana language 
after this decision, it may have intended to adopt the position that the 
domestic violence must have somehow negatively affected the child in 
order to raise the presumption. Further, the Louisiana interpretation is 
consistent with all Alaska cases that have considered section 150(g) to 
date.113 
3. Requirement that Violence Be Proved by a Preponderance of the 
Evidence.  The final requirement to invoke the presumption in section 
25.24.150(g) is that domestic violence be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Since the preponderance of the evidence standard does not 
require a prior trial or conviction, domestic violence may be raised for 
the first time at the custody hearing. The Alaska statute is virtually 
identical to the California,114 Louisiana,115 Massachusetts,116 
Minnesota,117 North Dakota,118 and Washington, D.C.119 standards in this 
regard. Other states place a higher burden of proof on the parent 
seeking to invoke presumptions against custody.120 For example, both 
 
 110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:361–69 (2008). 
 111. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on H.B. No. 385, 
supra note 71, at 0420 (statement of Allen M. Bailey, family law attorney). 
 112. Martin v. Martin, 833 So. 2d 1216, 1220–21 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 113. See, e.g., Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73 (Alaska 2007) (considering 
domestic violence between unmarried parents of a child whose custody was in 
dispute); O’Dell v. O’Dell, No. S-12097, 2007 WL 1378153 (Alaska May 9, 2007) 
(determining whether ex-husband had committed multiple acts of domestic 
violence against his ex-wife in deciding custody of their son). 
 114. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2004) (applying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard). 
 115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (2008) (requiring a finding of “family 
violence”). 
 116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31A, 209 (2001) (applying a preponderance of 
evidence standard); ch. 209, § 38; ch. 209C, § 10. 
 117. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2006) (requiring a “finding of domestic abuse”). 
 118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (2004) (requiring “credible evidence 
[of] domestic violence”). 
 119. D.C. CODE §§ 16-911, 16-914 (2001) (applying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard). 
 120. Although a presumption against custody is not invoked when there is 
little evidence of domestic violence, these courts may consider the evidence of 
domestic violence when determining which custody arrangement is in the 
child’s best interests. 
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Oklahoma121 and Nevada122 require a parent to show clear and 
convincing evidence of domestic violence; South Dakota requires a 
conviction of domestic abuse or assault, homicide of the other parent, or 
a history of domestic abuse proved by “greater convincing force of the 
evidence;”123 and Florida requires a conviction for a third-degree felony 
or higher involving domestic violence.124 Because Florida law otherwise 
favors shared custody,125 a parent who has been convicted of attempted 
murder,126 manslaughter,127 kidnapping,128 or aggravated child abuse129 
will likely be awarded joint custody. In Alaska, if these crimes are 
directed against a domestic living partner, the perpetrator will not be 
awarded joint or sole custody.130 
Raising the presumption upon a lower standard of proof is 
consistent with the standard required in other civil trials. Alaska courts 
have demonstrated that a low standard does not mean a parent will be 
rewarded for falsely accusing the other parent of abuse. In O’Dell v. 
O’Dell,131 for example, although the husband accused his wife of 
domestic violence, the superior court found that her behavior did not 
rise to the level of perpetrating domestic violence and awarded custody 
rights to both parents. 
 
 4.   Rebutting the Presumption.  The final important aspect of the 
Alaska presumption is that it is rebuttable. A parent found to be a 
perpetrator of domestic violence may rebut the presumption by showing 
that (1) he has successfully completed an intervention program for 
batterers; (2) he does not engage in substance abuse; and (3) the best 
interests of the child require that parent be awarded custody because the 
other parent is absent, suffers from a mental illness that affects ability to 
parent, or engages in substance abuse that affects his ability to parent.132 
Alternatively, he can prove that the child’s best interests require he be 
awarded custody.133 Alaska’s prescribed means of rebutting the 
presumption is a compromise between those states that list specific 
 
 121. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 (West 2001). 
 122. NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(5) (2004). 
 123. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-4-45.5, 25-4-45.6 (2004). 
 124. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (2008). 
 125. Id. 
 126. FLA. STAT. § 782.051(3) (2006). 
 127. FLA. STAT. § 782.07(1) (2006). 
 128. FLA. STAT. § 787.01(2) (2006). 
 129. FLA. STAT. § 827.03(2) (2006). 
 130. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2006) (defining domestic violence). 
 131. No. S-12097, 2007 WL 1378153 (Alaska May 9, 2007). 
 132. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(h). 
 133. Id. 
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factors for overcoming the presumption and those that leave it up to the 
judge to determine if the child’s best interests require custody with the 
abusive parent. 
On one end of the spectrum are states that require a perpetrator of 
domestic violence to take certain steps before a judge has discretion to 
look at the child’s best interests. Wisconsin’s presumption against 
custody is only rebutted if the perpetrator has successfully completed a 
program for batterers and the best interests of the child require custody 
with the previously abusive parent.134 
California is an example of a state that requires judges to consider 
multiple factors in determining whether the presumption has been 
rebutted. California judges must take into account: 
(1) Whether the perpetrator of domestic violence has 
demonstrated that giving sole or joint physical or legal custody 
of a child to the perpetrator is in the best interest of the 
child . . . . 
(2) Whether the perpetrator has satisfactorily completed a 
batterer’s treatment program . . . . 
(3) Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a 
program of alcohol or drug abuse counseling if the court 
determines that counseling is appropriate. 
(4) Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a 
parenting class if the court determines the class to be 
appropriate. 
(5) Whether the perpetrator is on probation or parole, and 
whether he or she has complied with the terms and conditions 
of probation or parole. 
(6) Whether the perpetrator is restrained by a protective order 
or restraining order, and whether he or she has complied with 
its terms and conditions. 
(7) Whether the perpetrator of domestic violence has 
committed any further acts of domestic violence.135 
In California, since none of these factors is determinative, the judge 
has a large amount of discretion to determine whether or not the 
abusive parent may be granted custody. Even more lenient standards for 
rebutting the presumption exist in states like Minnesota, where the code 
provides no explanation of how the presumption may be rebutted.136 
 
 134. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(d)(1) (2007). 
 135. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2008). 
 136. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17(2) (2008) (stating that “the court shall use a 
rebuttable presumption that joint legal or physical custody is not in the best 
interests of the child if domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has 
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The rebuttable presumption merely shifts the burden to the abusive 
parent to show that he is fit to parent, rather than placing the burden on 
the victimized parent to show that the abuser is unfit. Although the 
Alaska statute outlines one way to overcome the presumption, 
requirements for rebuttal appear to be on the more lenient side: in an 
unpublished case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a perpetrator of 
domestic violence had overcome the presumption, but did not explain 
why.137 
 
IV.  THE ALASKA STATUTE SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSES SOME 
CONCERNS OVER THE EFFECTS OF PARENTING BY PERPETRATORS  
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
A. Existence of a Rebuttable Presumption 
The existence of a rebuttable presumption in Alaska law is 
beneficial to children involved in custody disputes. First, the 
presumption may encourage abused parents to leave their violent 
partner. Second, the presumption ensures that courts consider the 
existence of domestic violence in making custody decisions. Third, the 
presumption nullifies other considerations in Alaska custody law that 
disfavor an abused parent. Fourth, the presumption simplifies custody 
cases by treating divorcing perpetrators of domestic violence like 
perpetrators who remain married. 
First, section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes may encourage a 
parent to leave an abusive relationship. As the United States Congress 
noted, “[a]bused spouses . . . often have difficulty in separating from 
their abuser because of the tremendous insecurity that such abuse 
fosters and a lack of financial resources to leave the family home. 
Moreover, many women fear that if they seek a divorce, they will lose 
custody of their children.”138 Victims of domestic violence often make 
decisions to stay with or leave the perpetrator based on their sense of the 
best interests of their children.139 Therefore, if a victim of domestic 
violence believes she will lose access to her children, it is unlikely that 
 
occurred between the parents,” but failing to explain how the presumption may 
be rebutted). 
 137. O'Dell v. O’Dell, No. S-12097, 2007 WL 1378153, at *5 (Alaska May 9, 
2007). 
 138. 136 CONG. REC. H8282 (1990). 
 139. EDLESON ET AL., supra note 16, at 15. 
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she will leave the abusive relationship.140 By removing this fear, the 
presumption encourages the victimized parent to leave, ending a 
situation that is detrimental to the child.141 
Second, the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska 
Statutes ensures that courts give adequate weight to the existence of 
domestic violence in determining the child’s best interests. Though 
Alaska courts were required to consider domestic violence prior to the 
2004 amendments, abusive fathers still won custody cases up to 70% of 
the time.142 At least one study shows that allegations of domestic 
violence have no demonstrated effect on the rate at which fathers obtain 
custody of their children.143 Another shows that female victims of 
domestic violence are actually less likely to be awarded sole legal 
custody of their children than are non-victims.144 Given the impact that 
domestic violence has on a child’s development, these figures suggest 
that courts emphasized other factors in making custody decisions. 
Section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes may remedy this problem by 
requiring courts to address domestic violence when it is credibly 
raised.145 In fact, one study of rebuttable presumptions in fifteen states 
revealed that the presumption does have a palpable effect on custody 
awards: the victimized mother obtained sole custody at a rate of fifty-
two percent in states with a rebuttable presumption.146  In contrast, in 
states without a rebuttable presumption, victimized mothers obtained 
sole custody only thirty-one percent of the time.147 
 
 140. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No. 
385, supra note 71, at 2049 (statement of Christine McLeod Pate, Mentoring  
Attorney, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault). 
 141. See Julie Kunce Field & Karen Gulberg Cook, “But He Never Hit the Kids”: 
Domestic Violence as Family Abuse, 73 MICH. BAR J. 922, 922 (1994) (arguing that 
domestic violence against a spouse is child abuse). 
 142. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No. 
385, supra note 71, at 0179 (statement of Lesil McGuire, Chair of H. Judiciary 
Standing Comm. and Sponsor of H.B. 385). 
 143. Kernic et al., supra note 20, at 1006, 1014 (finding that mothers who were 
victims of a history of domestic violence were no more likely to be awarded 
custody than mothers who were not victims). 
 144. Nancy E. Johnson et al., Child Custody Mediation in Cases of Domestic 
Violence: Empirical Evidence of a Failure to Protect, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
1022, 1035 (2005). 
 145. See Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73, 77 (Alaska 2007) (finding plain 
error where the trial court does not make findings as to a history of perpetuating 
domestic violence when the record shows that domestic violence has occurred). 
 146. Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the 
Father Has Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
1076, 1093 (2005). 
 147. Id. 
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While the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska 
Statutes may not be necessary in all cases for a court to appropriately 
consider domestic violence in child custody disputes,148 it is the best way 
to ensure that domestic violence is always appropriately considered. In 
many custody cases, the judges, child custody investigators, and 
guardians ad litem that effectively decide the custody question have 
little to no training in domestic violence.149 As the legislative history of 
House Bill 385 reveals, the child custody investigators charged with 
making expert recommendations on a child’s best interests are not 
required to have any training in domestic violence or sexual abuse.150 
Lack of familiarity with domestic violence may be worse in rural areas 
where the magistrate’s legal experience is limited.151 Many studies assert 
that the judicial and social workers involved in custody cases tend to 
dismiss charges of spousal abuse or consider spousal abuse irrelevant to 
child custody.152 Carstens v. Carstens,153 wherein the Alaska Supreme 
Court confirmed a custody award to the allegedly violent parent, 
provides a good example.154 There, “the trial judge made specific 
findings that there was no showing that the alleged abuse affected or 
would affect” the child.155 Since the trial court actually considered the 
history of abuse, the appellate court would not reverse its determination 
that placement with the abusive parent was in the best interests of the 
child.156 Other inappropriate outcomes in custody proceedings where 
domestic violence was a factor were cited in a public hearing on House 
Bill 385, indicating just how widespread the problem was before section 
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes was adopted.157 
 
 148. See, e.g., Farrell v. Farrell, 819 P.2d 896, 899 (Alaska 1991) (reasoning that 
since joint legal custody is appropriate only when parents can cooperate and 
communicate in the child’s best interests, joint legal custody was inappropriate). 
 149. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No. 
385, supra note 71, at 1947 (statement of Christine McLeod Pate, Mentoring  
Attorney, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at tape 04-31, side A, No. 1491 (statement of Dennis L. McCarty, 
Attorney at Law). 
 152. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic 
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1072 (1991) (citing 
studies in Nevada, Maryland, and Florida). 
 153. 867 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1994). 
 154. Id. at 808. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No. 
385, supra note 71, at 0747, 0995, 1170 (statements of Tracy Gould, Kimberlee 
Vanderhoof, Gigi Pilcher). 
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Third, even where courts do recognize that domestic violence is 
significant to a child’s best interests, abusers may still have an advantage 
in custody disputes where domestic violence is merely a factor in 
custody determinations. Batterers may present themselves well in court 
because of the characteristics that are common among abusive spouses: 
confidence, ability to manipulate, and denial of abusive behavior. 
Frequently, the key witness for a previously abusive father is his new 
partner; her testimony that the father is not violent implies that his past 
abuse related directly to his interactions with the mother, effectively 
shifting blame to her.158 In contrast to domestic violence perpetrators, 
victims may appear weak in court. Not only will a victim be afraid to 
confront her abuser in court,159 but she may suffer from psychological 
effects such as post-traumatic disorder,160 anxiety,161 depression,162 and 
suicidality.163 Victims are often noted as “irrational, over-emotional, 
spiteful, and vindictive.”164 
Further, the presumption takes on extra significance in a state like 
Alaska where child custody laws contain a friendly parent provision. 
 
 158. See PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL 
FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 32 (2002). 
 159. See Demie Kurz, Separation, Divorce, and Woman Abuse, 2 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 63, 72 (1996) (finding that fear following separation from an 
abusive spouse may prevent women from fighting for their rights in custody 
proceedings). 
 160. See Jacqueline M. Golding, Intimate Partner Violence as a Risk Factor for 
Mental Disorders: A Meta-Analysis, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 99, 116–17 (1999) 
(comparing eleven studies of women who experienced intimate partner violence 
to find that the mean prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder among 
battered women was 63.8 percent, compared to 1.3–12.3% in the general 
population); Millie C. Astin et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Childhood 
Abuse in Battered Women: Comparisons with Maritally Distressed Women, 63 J. 
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 308, 310 (1995) (finding that battered 
women exhibited significantly higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder than 
maritally distressed women—58% compared to 18.9%). 
 161. See Mary N. Russell et al., Psychological Profiles of Violent and Nonviolent 
Maritally Distressed Couples, 26 PSYCHOTHERAPY 81, 82 (1989). 
 162. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 111 (2d ed. 
1999); GOLDING, supra note 160, at 106 (comparing eighteen studies of women 
who experienced intimate partner violence to find that the mean prevalence of 
depression among battered women was 47.6%, compared to somewhere 
between 10.2%–21.3% in the general population of women). 
 163. See Golding, supra note 160, at 112–13 (comparing thirteen studies of 
women who experienced intimate partner violence to find that the mean 
prevalence of suicidality among battered women was 17.9%, compared to 6.6% 
in the general population of women).  “Suicidality” includes thoughts of 
attempts at suicide.  Id. at 112. 
 164. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No. 
385, supra note 71, at 1947 (statement of Christine McLeod Pate, Mentoring 
Attorney, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault). 
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Absent the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes, 
Alaska courts often favored the parent who was most likely to foster a 
friendly relationship under section 25.24.150(c)(6) of the Alaska Statutes: 
abusive parents were awarded custody where the victimized parent was 
unwilling to cooperate with the other parent—her former abuser.165 
Merely raising the issue that the other parent is unfit could count against 
the victimized parent.166 Similarly, minimizing contact with the abuser—
a natural reaction for a victim of domestic violence—may count against 
the victimized parent.167 The result is that friendly parent provisions 
“reinforce learned helplessness in the victimized parent by encouraging 
her to suppress her complaints for fear that she will lose custody if she 
flees, denies her abuser visitation, or complains about his abusiveness in 
court.”168 Even more striking is that the friendly parent provision is 
more commonly applied against the mother—the parent more likely to 
be the victim of abuse—than the father.169 However, House Bill 385 
amended section 25.24.150(c)(6) of the Alaska Statutes so that domestic 
violence effectively trumps the friendly parent provision: 
Once the trial court makes an evidence-based finding that 
domestic violence occurred, however, it should explicitly 
address whether or not the parent is a continuing threat to the 
health and safety of the other parent of the children prior to 
relying on the parent’s willingness to foster a relationship 
under AS 25.24.150(c)(6).170 
Therefore, Alaska’s rebuttable presumption is necessary to nullify 
the friendly parent provision—a custody consideration that would 
otherwise favor custody with the abusive parent. 
 
 165. Id. at 0179 (statement of Lesil McGuire, Chair of the House Judiciary 
Standing Committee) (“‘Friendly parent’ statutes are often used by abusive 
parents against the protective parent.”); see, e.g., Van Sickle v. McGraw, 134 P.3d 
338, 341 (Alaska 2006) (affirming award of custody to father, who perpetrated 
domestic violence, because he was better at achieving an “open and loving 
frequent relationship” with the other parent). 
 166. See Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill 
No. 385, supra note 71, at 0995 (statement of Kimberlee Vanderhoof, Program 
Director, Careline Crisis Intervention) (telling the story of domestic violence 
victim who was admonished by the court for disputing custody with her 
abuser). 
 167. See ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, supra note 78, at 134 
(“Domestic violence victims, often for the safety of their children and 
themselves, take active steps to minimize contact and relationships with the 
abuser.”). 
 168. Joan Zorza, Friendly Parent Provisions in Custody Determinations, 26 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 924, 925 (1992). 
 169. Id. at 924. 
 170. Puddicombe v. Dreka, 167 P.3d 73, 77 (Alaska 2007). 
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Fourth, a presumption against a perpetrator of domestic violence is 
consistent with the treatment of abusive parents in households where 
custody is not at issue. The Alaska child welfare agency is authorized to 
remove a perpetrator of domestic violence from the household and to 
prevent removal of the child from the non-offending parent.171 
It is important to note that a rebuttable presumption may not be as 
necessary in Alaska as it is in states that presume joint custody is in a 
child’s best interests. For example, section 518.17(2) of the Minnesota 
Statutes provides that joint custody is presumed to be in the best 
interests of a child.172 Absent a presumption overriding section 
518.17(2)(d) of the Minnesota statutes, a parent with a history of 
perpetrating domestic violence must be given joint custody if he so 
requests it.173 The presumption in Minnesota is therefore indispensable 
to ensuring a child’s best interests, because even a judge’s discretion 
could not prevent placement with the abusive parent. Further, if a judge 
in a state that presumes joint custody is in a child’s best interests does 
not believe a parent’s allegations of domestic violence, he must award 
joint custody.174 Therefore, in states like Minnesota, it is crucial that the 
level of proof and abuse required to invoke the presumption be low. 
B. Ease of Invoking the Presumption 
Requiring only a preponderance of the evidence to invoke the 
presumption against custody benefits the victimized parent and the 
child. Higher standards—for instance, requiring a criminal conviction—
would not serve Alaska’s policy goal of protecting children and 
victimized parents from their abusers. It is highly likely that a custody 
trial will be the first time that victimized parents raise the issue of abuse: 
while they are still living with abusive partners, victims of domestic 
violence may believe that reporting the violence to police or filing for a 
protective order will only encourage retaliation.175 Moreover, a 
documented, substantiated history of domestic violence surfaces in 
fewer than twenty-five percent of the cases where a police report or 
protection order exists.176 Since Alaska courts must apply the 
presumption against custody based on a preponderance of the evidence, 
 
 171. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.035 (2006). 
 172. MINN. STAT. § 518.17(2)(d) (2006). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of 
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 JUDGES J. 38, 39 
(1997). 
 176. Kernic et al., supra note 20, at 1005. 
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the victimized parent and child are not disadvantaged if they have failed 
to institute an action against the abusive parent in the past or if the 
victimized parent fails to present evidence of such an action at the 
custody hearing. 
Proponents of higher standards of proof—like those in Florida and 
Nevada177—take the position that a parent accused of perpetrating 
domestic violence may have used violence as a way of protecting 
himself.178 Thus, the presumption against the victim of domestic 
violence is detrimental to the child because it discourages a victim-
parent from leaving an abusive relationship if she used violence to 
defend herself or her children in the past.179 Further, if the level of abuse 
required to invoke the presumption is low, then a judge may apply the 
presumption against the victimized parent and award custody to the 
abusive parent.180 Finally, supporters contend that finding a 
presumption against custody with minimal evidence is inconsistent with 
the strength of a parent’s interest in his relationship with his child.181 
These arguments are unfounded. First, courts can and do consider 
which parent is the dominant aggressor, largely eliminating the 
possibility that the presumption will be invoked against a victimized 
 
 177. See  FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (2006) (requiring “[e]vidence that a parent 
has been convicted of a felony of the third degree or higher involving domestic 
violence” in order to invoke a rebuttable presumption against “shared parental 
responsibility” with the perpetrator); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.230(1) (2007) 
(requiring the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and find clear and 
convincing evidence of domestic violence to invoke the presumption against 
custody). 
 178. See Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread 
Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. R. 454, 457 (2008) 
(proposing that applying rebuttable presumptions against custody for a single 
incidence of violence would be inappropriate where the perpetrator is, in fact, a 
victim of domestic violence). 
 179. See Cheryl Terrance et al., Maternal Blame: Battered Women and Abused 
Children, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 870, 873 (2008) (“Women may also 
remain [in abusive relationships] because of fear of losing custody or not being 
believed.”). 
 180. See Ver Steegh & Dalton, supra note 176 at 457; Castle v. Simmons, 86 
P.3d 1042, 1045 (Nev. 2004) (“[B]y requiring the court . . . to conduct a hearing 
and to find by clear and convincing evidence that domestic violence occurred, 
the Legislature has protected innocent parents from unfounded allegations.”). 
 181. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION ACT 
§§ 102(c), 103, 109(2) (recommending laws that create unalienable parental rights 
which can only be abridged due to abuse proved beyond a reasonable doubt), 
available at http://www.childrensjustice.org/uprepa.htm; see also Joan S. Meier, 
Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial 
Resistance and Imagining Solutions, 11 J. GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY, & LAW 657, 710–
12 (discussing judicial reluctance to terminate a parent’s relationships with his 
children, despite evidence of that parent’s abuse). 
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parent. Second, a high burden of proof is not necessary to protect a 
parent’s right to a relationship with his child, since it is highly unlikely 
that a parent will fabricate allegations of abuse to obtain custody. 
First, the potential for invoking the presumption against a 
victimized parent who is merely protecting herself is easily mitigated by 
a “dominant aggressor” clause, a requirement that the court determine 
which parent instigated the domestic violence. Such clauses are common 
in state penal codes that direct police officers to ascertain which party is 
primarily responsible for an incident of domestic violence and to arrest 
that party only.182 Some state custody statutes, including the Alaska 
statute, contain a dominant aggressor clause or a similar 
consideration.183 For example, Delaware’s custody statutes require that, 
if both parents have a history of perpetrating domestic violence, courts 
must consider whether one parent was the dominant aggressor when 
making a custody determination.184 However, the statute does not 
prohibit the court from placing children with the dominant aggressor.185 
Similarly, the Alaska custody statutes include a clause which requires 
 
 182. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-134 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113(a)(1) 
(2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(b) (West 2000); FLA. STAT. § 741.29(4)(b) (2006); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20.1(b) (2008); IOWA CODE § 236.12(3) (2008); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 46:2140(1) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-204(b) (West 2001); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 455.085(3) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-311(2)(b) (2007); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 29-439(1) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137(2) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 173-B:10(II) (2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c) (McKinney 2004); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-10(2) (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 60.16(B) (2003); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 12-29-3(c)(2) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70(D) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 25-10-35 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-619(b) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-36-2.2(3) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(B) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.31.100(2)(c) (2002); WIS. STAT. § 968.075(2)(1)(c)(am) (2007); but see OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B)(3)(b) (West 2006) (explicitly providing that an officer 
may arrest any family member in violation of domestic violence statute even if 
he was not the primary aggressor). 
 183. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(i)(1) (2006); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 
705A (2008) (requiring courts to consider whether one parent was the primary 
aggressor in making custody determinations if both parents have a history of 
perpetrating domestic violence); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:364(B) (2000) (“If the 
court finds that both parents have a history of perpetrating family violence, 
custody shall be awarded solely to the parent who is less likely to continue to 
perpetrate family violence.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(6) (2006) (requiring 
courts to determine who the dominant aggressor is and to apply the 
presumption against custody to that parent only; listing factors to consider in 
determining the dominant aggressor); WIS. STAT. §§ 767.41(2)(d)(b)(2)–(4); Krank 
v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 848 n.2 (N.D. 1995) (excluding conduct that is part of 
battered spouse syndrome from domestic violence); see generally State v. Marr, 
765 A.2d 645, 651 n.1 (Md. 2001) (discussing various states’ interpretations of 
whether conduct amounts to self defense or domestic violence). 
 184. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 705A (2008). 
 185. Id. 
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courts to place children with the parent who is “less likely to continue to 
perpetrate the violence” if both parents have a history of perpetrating 
domestic violence.186 Though Alaska’s custody statute is not equivalent 
to a dominant aggressor clause, it can easily be applied to require courts 
to determine who the dominant aggressor is: if one parent is merely 
reacting to violence perpetrated by the other, she is clearly less likely to 
continue the violent behavior than the parent who is instigating the 
abuse.187 
Second, requiring a high standard of proof of abuse is unnecessary 
to alleviate fears that one parent will falsely accuse another of domestic 
violence in custody disputes.188 One study found that only 1.3% of 
female-initiated allegations of abuse against the father were 
intentionally false.189 Further, parents in the midst of custody disputes 
are no more likely to make false accusations of abuse than are members 
of the general population.190 A National Center on Child Abuse and 
Neglect study of 9000 custody disputes where sexual abuse was alleged 
“found no evidence to support the belief that these cases typically 
involved mothers falsely accusing fathers to gain or maintain custody of 
the children.”191 This study also reported that allegations of abuse were 
more likely to be valid in families with older children, most likely 
because the child can provide a check on a parent who might otherwise 
 
 186. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(i)(1) (2006). 
 187. See FOURTH BATTERED MOTHERS CUSTODY CONFERENCE, TESTIMONY TO THE 
TRUTH COMMISSION 7 (2007), http://stopfamilyviolence.org/media/Truth%20 
Commission%20Final%2007.pdf (listing reasons that explain why the dominant 
abuser is responsible for violence). 
 188. See generally RICHARD A. GARDNER, PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A 
GUIDE FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (2d ed. 1998) (blaming one 
parent—usually a woman—for vilifying the other parent, frequently in the 
context of custody disputes; arguing that allegations of abuse are a symptom of 
a psychological problem called Parental Alienation Syndrome and should not be 
taken seriously in most cases).  The American Psychological Association has 
noted that no data support the existence of Parental Alienation Syndrome. Press 
Release, Am. Psychological Ass’n, Statement on Parental Alienation Syndrome 
(Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://www.apa.org/releases/ passyndrome.html. 
 189. Nicholas Bala & John Schuman, Allegations of Sexual Abuse when Parents 
Have Separated, 17 CAN. FAM. LAW Q. 191, 196 (2000). 
 190. Thea Brown et al., Revealing the Existence of Child Abuse in the Context of 
Marital Breakdown and Custody and Access Disputes, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
849, 852 (2000) (finding that false child abuse allegations occurred no more 
frequently in custody proceedings than in other circumstances). 
 191. Nancy Thoennes & Patricia G. Tjaden, The Extent, Nature, and Validity of 
Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody/Visitation Disputes, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
151, 161 (1990). In fact, fathers are far more likely to make intentionally false 
accusations of abuse than mothers are. Nico Trocme & Nicholas Bala, False 
Allegations of Abuse and Neglect when Parents Separate, 29 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
1333, 1341 (2005). 
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make a false accusation of abuse.192 Since false allegations of abuse are so 
infrequent and since falsity can be easily verified by simple testimony 
from a child, a low burden for producing evidence of domestic violence 
is sufficient for invoking presumptions against custody. 
C. Effect of Presumption on Visitation Benefits Children 
Allowing a domestic violence perpetrator to have only supervised 
visitation with a child protects the child’s best interests. Growing up in a 
household where domestic violence is present may have devastating 
effects on a child’s psychological and emotional development and may 
also result in physical harm to the child.193 Limiting physical access to 
the child prevents further harm and may also allow the child to heal. 
First, continuing contact with a perpetrator of domestic violence 
may cause ongoing harm to a child. Bancroft and Silverman drew on 
their clinical experience to enumerate a number of those risks: (1) risk of 
continued undermining of the mother’s parenting and the mother-child 
relationship; (2) risk of continued exposure to authoritarian or neglectful 
parenting; (3) risk of exposure to new threats of violence, psychological 
maltreatment, or direct victimization by the batterer; (4) risk of learning 
violence-supportive beliefs and attitudes; (5) risk of being abducted or 
otherwise used as a tool of the perpetrator; and (6) risk of the child’s 
exposure to violence in the father’s subsequent relationship with other 
women.194 Since the purpose of Alaska’s statutory presumption is to 
protect children, limiting contact is desirable. 
Second, keeping a child away from a batterer may reduce the 
harmful effects of living in an abusive family. Children appear to exhibit 
fewer problems as time elapses from their last exposure to a violent 
event.195 Therefore, ensuring that children are not re-exposed to violence 
is beneficial to them. 
V.  IMPROVING THE ALASKA CUSTODY STATUTES 
Although the existence of a rebuttable presumption is preferable to 
a more general “best interests of the child” standard, the Alaska Statutes 
would benefit from further clarifications and expansions. First, a child 
 
 192. Thoennes & Tjaden, supra note 191, at 161. 
 193. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 194. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 38, at 2–4. 
 195. Jeffrey L. Edleson et al., How Children are Involved in Adult Domestic 
Violence: Results from a Four City Telephone Survey, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
18, 27–28 (2003) (finding that children in secure environments are less likely to 
intervene in domestic violence between adults). 
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whose parent has perpetrated domestic violence should be able to raise 
the presumption. Second, the Alaska Legislature should clarify the term 
“domestic living partner.” Third, judges should not have such wide 
discretion to allow for unsupervised visitation with a parent who has 
perpetrated domestic violence. 
A. Allow the Child to Raise the Presumption 
Alaska should allow a child who is the subject of a custody 
proceeding to present evidence of domestic violence in order to raise the 
presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes. Alaska courts 
already consider a child’s preference, if he is old enough to state one, 
when making custody decisions.196 However, if a parent does not raise 
the issue of domestic violence and ask for the rebuttable presumption, 
the presumption may be waived in a custody hearing.197 For example, in 
Thomas v. Thomas,198 a victimized mother presented uncontroverted 
evidence of her ex-husband’s history of domestic violence at trial.199 
Since the mother did not ask to raise the presumption in section 
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes, the court was merely required to 
weigh evidence of the abuse under section 25.24.150(c) of the Alaska 
Statutes’ best interests analysis.200  Similarly, in Ginn-Williams v. 
Williams,201 the Alaska Supreme Court held that where neither party had 
brought up domestic violence until after entering a final and binding 
agreement, the court could not address the issue on appeal.202 
Thomas and Ginn-Williams are not merely anecdotal: a 2005 study 
conducted in Washington revealed that in 246 families where police 
incident reports or court orders indicated a preexisting history of male-
perpetrated domestic violence, domestic violence was mentioned in 
fewer than 53% of custody hearings.203 This study and others 
 
 196. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(3) (2006). 
 197. See, e.g., Ginn-Williams v. Williams, 143 P.3d 949, 951–52 (Alaska 2006) 
(holding that raising concerns over domestic violence is not permissible where 
parties had not brought up domestic violence before reaching a final and 
binding custody agreement). 
 198. 171. P.3d 98 (Alaska 2007). 
 199. Id. at 106. 
 200. Id. at 106 n.26. 
 201. 143 P.3d 949 (Alaska 2006). 
 202. Id. at 952–53. 
 203. Mary A. Kernic et. al., Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody 
Determinations Among Couples with a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 991, 1005 (2005). 
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demonstrate that mothers frequently fail to report abuse to the courts 
even where substantial proof of abuse exists.204 
This outcome is inconsistent with the purpose of section 
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes: the parents’ failure to raise domestic 
violence should not waive a child’s interest in being placed in a safe and 
stable household. The problem is somewhat mitigated in Alaska since 
children may be issued protective orders against an abusive parent.205 
Still, a “lack of evidence . . . along with the shame and denial that often 
accompanies [domestic violence]” means that abusive parents often win 
custody cases.206 Allowing a child to present evidence of domestic 
violence creates one more potential source of evidence, further 
protecting the integrity of the judicial process. 
Allowing a child to raise the issue of domestic violence is consistent 
with Alaska law and the law in other states. Alaska law provides that a 
guardian ad litem may be appointed in civil cases where the child is not 
the actual petitioner.207 Further, a third party may initiate a suit for a 
protective order against a parent on behalf of the child.208 These 
provisions do not apply to custody hearings; custody, however, may be 
decided during hearings for protective orders.209 Given that children 
and their representatives may actually initiate or participate in 
proceedings that may affect custody, allowing children to have a role in 
hearings that will certainly affect custody makes sense. 
B. Clarify the Meaning of “Domestic Living Partner” 
By stating that the presumption in section 25.24.150(g) of the 
Alaska Statutes is raised whenever domestic violence is committed 
against a “domestic living partner,” the Alaska Statutes add a layer of 
 
 204. See Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Women 
Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134 (1999) (reviewing studies that show 
inconsistencies in reports of domestic violence to courts, counties, and shelters). 
 205. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2006) (providing that a parent, guardian, 
or other representative may file a petition on a minor’s behalf for a protective 
order against a household member when the minor has been a victim of 
domestic violence). The Alaska statute does not allow the minor to file a petition 
for a protective order if he has not been a “victim” of domestic violence, though 
the statute does not define the word “victim” to require that abuse be directed at 
the minor. Id. 
 206. Transcript of Audio Cassettes of Committee Minutes on House Bill No. 
385, supra note 71, at 1947 (statement of Christine McLeod Pate, Mentoring 
Attorney, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault). 
 207. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a) (2006). 
 208. Id. 
 209. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(9) (2006). 
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confusion to an already difficult issue for the courts.210 “Domestic living 
partner” is not defined in the Alaska Statutes, nor has the Alaska 
Supreme Court clarified what the term means.211 Both a broad and a 
narrow interpretation are consistent with the legislative history.212 This 
ambiguity may interfere with the purpose of the presumption in section 
25.24.150(g) of the Alaska Statutes. 
If a court applies a narrow interpretation of the statute and uses the 
presumption only when an abusive parent directed violence against a 
person with whom a child had contact, then the court overlooks the risk 
that the parent will abuse the child. Since studies demonstrate that 
parents who abuse partners are more likely to abuse their children, this 
danger is grave.213 Moreover, the narrow interpretation of “domestic 
living partner” ignores that an abusive parent could use his past history 
of violence to scare the other parent, even when violence was never 
directed at that parent. In such a situation, co-parenting would be 
detrimental to the child. 
If a court applies a broad interpretation of the statute and uses the 
presumption when a parent has been violent toward a former partner, 
then it may lose sight entirely of the purpose of section 25.24.150(g) of 
the Alaska Statutes. Under the broader interpretation of “domestic 
living partner,” whether a parent has perpetrated domestic violence 
may become the central issue of a custody hearing. Since judges may not 
be well-equipped to consider the importance of domestic violence, this 
outcome would be exactly what section 25.24.150(g) of the Alaska 
Statutes attempted to avoid. 
The Alaska Legislature or the Alaska courts must either clarify the 
meaning of “domestic living partner” or risk that custody disputes 
devolve into a trial on all past parental conduct, regardless of its 
relevance to the child’s best interests. 
C. Limit Judicial Discretion to Allow Unsupervised Visitation with a 
Perpetrator of Domestic Violence 
That a judge may allow unsupervised visitation if an abusive 
parent fulfills certain requirements somewhat diminishes the benefit of 
the presumption against custody.214 As a Louisiana case noted, the 
 
 210. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 211. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 212. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 213. See EDLESON ET AL., supra note 16, at 9. 
 214. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(j) (2006) (“[C]ourt may allow unsupervised 
visitation if . . . the violent parent has completed a substance abuse treatment 
program if the court considers it appropriate, is not abusing alcohol or 
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purpose of prohibiting contact between an abusive parent and his child 
until the court finds that the parent has successfully completed a 
treatment program is to “remove even the possibility of further abuse of 
the child at the hands of the parent due to perceived failures of existing 
laws.”215 Unless a judge finds that the perpetrator of domestic violence 
no longer poses a danger to the child, both Alaska and Louisiana law 
prohibit even supervised visitation between an abusive parent and a 
child until the parent has completed a program for perpetrators of 
domestic violence.216 If a judge finds that an abusive parent is no longer 
a threat, he is authorized to allow unsupervised visitation.217 However, 
the Legislature does not define how a judge should determine whether 
the perpetrator poses a danger to the child; nor does it delineate factors 
for determining whether a child’s best interests requires unsupervised 
visitation.218 
Though section 25.24.150(j) of the Alaska Statutes requires that an 
abusive parent make some showing that he should be allowed to have 
unsupervised visitation,219 giving a judge discretion to allow 
unsupervised visitation ignores the main purpose for creating a 
rebuttable presumption: judges may still place too little emphasis on the 
likelihood of future harm to the child and the abused parent. Assessing 
the ongoing risks to children from households with domestic violence is 
complex. Bancroft and Silverman outlined nine factors that should be 
considered in assessing the risks described above, including attention to: 
(1) the perpetrator’s history of physical or sexual abuse and neglect of 
his children, (2) the level of continued danger to the non-abusive parent, 
(3) a history of abuse of the children and other parent, (4) a history of 
using children in or exposing them to violent events, (5) the level of 
coercive control that the perpetrator has exercised in the past, (6) the 
degree to which the perpetrator feels entitled to access and other family 
privileges, (7) a history of substance abuse and mental illness, (8) a 
willingness to accept the decisions of the victim and of social institutions 
such as law enforcement and the courts, and (9) the risk of child 
abduction.220 Given that judges are not necessarily trained to understand 
 
psychoactive drugs, does not pose a danger of mental or physical harm to the 
child, and unsupervised visitation is in the child’s best interests.”). 
 215. State in re A.C., 643 So.2d 719, 731 (La. 1994). 
 216. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(j) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(B) 
(2000). 
 217. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(j) (2006). 
 218. See id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 38, at 2–4. 
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or even to be aware of these factors,221 allowing them such discretion to 
provide for unsupervised visitation is inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
House Bill 385 intended to serve the best interests of the child by 
presuming that custody with a perpetrator of domestic violence is not in 
a child’s best interests. The existence of a rebuttable presumption is 
beneficial to children and victims of domestic violence. Further, the 
effect that the presumption has on an abusive parent’s contact with the 
child may not only protect the child from further harm, but also help the 
child recover from the detrimental effects of living in a household where 
domestic violence was present. However, the Alaska Statutes could be 
strengthened with greater opportunity for children to raise the 
presumption, clarification of key terms, and less judicial discretion in 
undoing the effect of the presumption. 
 
 
 221. See supra notes 149–56 and accompanying text. 
